SEA POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The players in Southeast Asia all have major strengths and weaknesses in their ability to control the sea lines of communication. These are a result of economic and geographic conditions, and are not necessarily an indication of any preconceived design to dominate the region from the sea.

China has the largest population, and one of the largest navies in the world (Table 2 and Tables 9-10 in Appendix). Its economy is the second largest in the region after Japan's (Central Intelligence Agency 1994). This is purely the result of the aggregate output of over 1 billion people, and not of their relative productivity. If compared on a Purchasing Power Parity basis, the Chinese economy is the second largest in the world, eclipsing Japan (See Table 3).

The sheer size of the economy does allow China to build a substantial navy. However, the Chinese Navy is subordinated to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as even its official title (the People's Liberation Army's Navy or PLAN) makes clear (Swanson 1982). This force structure had tilted the PLAN toward coastal defense. This was the traditional role of the Chinese Navy (Swanson 1982). Only twice in Chinese history have the Maritime advocates--those seeking a strong ocean-going presence--gained ascendancy. In the 15th Century the Chinese sailed seven expeditions to the various countries surrounding the South China Sea, and into the Indian Ocean (Swanson 1982). The second maritime period produced the late 19th Century navy destroyed by the Japanese at the Battle of theYalu River and in the port of Weihai (Jane 1904).

China has struggled in putting together a navy for two reasons. Before the Opium War, the difficulty was the continental emphasis by the majority of the Chinese emperors. After the Opium War, the Chinese lacked the technology needed to have a credible naval deterrent. The only way they could close the technology gap was to spend vast sums of money buying the technology elsewhere (Swanson 1982).

In keeping with the traditional view of the Chinese leadership, the PLA kept the navy as predominantly a coastal defense force. It was very heavily dependent on a force of missile boats backed up by fast gun and torpedo boats (Muller 1983). The maximum range of these boats was around 500 nautical miles. This would have allowed them strike missions against shipping in the Formosa Straits or most of the South China Sea, provided that there was no opposition (Table 2).

The other strength of the Chinese Navy was its sizable submarine force. Composed primarily of Romeos and Whiskeys bought from the Soviet Union it would have provided problems for any opponent save for the superpowers.

Since the end of the cold war, the Chinese have responded to the overall threat reduction by increasing both their international trade and the quality of their naval force. The Chinese Navy, like the Soviet Navy a generation before, is evolving into a blue water force as the Maritime advocates have gained prominence (Swanson 1982). The current emphasis is on a force of frigates and destroyers capable of operating anywhere in the Western Pacific, or cruising for lengthy periods of time in the South China Sea. The submarine force has been upgraded to include a handful of nuclear submarines. In addition, the Chinese Navy fields the only ballistic missile submarines in East Asia outside of the superpowers (Mann and Holley 1992).

China has been reported to be seeking a conventional aircraft carrier capability such as the Varyag, the aircraft carrier unfinished by the Soviet Union after the collapse (Mycio 1992). Other reports suggest that the Chinese are trying to buy aircraft carriers due to be scrapped in hope of reverse engineering the crafts (Greenburger 1992). In any event, China currently lacks aircraft suitable for carrier operations, and would take upwards of twenty years to learn how to do US style carrier operations effectively, not having any prior experience in one of the most demanding of naval operations (Southerland 1989). Should the Chinese receive Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft such as the British Harrier, then the time to adapt to carrier operations would be greatly reduced.

The chief strategic strength of the Chinese is a lack of strong enemies in the region. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated a large part of the northern threat to China, and the consequent withdrawal of US forces from the region, China has found itself in an unaccustomed power vacuum for the first time in several centuries. The last time China found itself unthreatened, in the 15th Century, the Chinese built a large navy and sent out seven expeditions all the way to Madagascar (Kennedy 1987). The purpose of these expeditions was to seek acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Chinese emperor (Swanson 1982). History may repeat itself.

The chief weakness of the PRC is its current lack of a sound technological foundation. Despite its size, it is dependent on others for key components of its navy. The radar and SAMs on its newer ships are supplied by the French, as are the helicopters. The newest strike fighters are purchased from the Russians, although like the previous generations, these may also be redesigned by the Chinese. This technological weakness, although serious, are no worse than Japan's and of lesser import than Taiwan's or the ASEAN's.

China also risks returning to the warlord days of the early part of this century when the current leadership dies off (Yang, et al. 1994). Regional differences in economic outlook have gone so far as to produce regional protectionism through tariffs on inter-provincial commerce. The country also has had some of the same problems with the Muslim population of Xinjiang province as the Soviets have had with their Central Asian provinces (Dreyer 1994). China could dissolve temporarily into autonomous regions much like Taiwan until central authority is restored (Yang, et al. 1994).

In contrast to China, Japan has strengths where China has weaknesses and vice versa. Japan has the most technologically advanced economy in the region. Gross Domestic Product measured by exchange rates gives Japan the largest economy in the region. Indeed, Japan produced more tonnage of ships in 1975, the peak year of Japanese building, than the U.S. did at its peak in 1943 at the height of World War II--18 million tons of shipping to 12 million (Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 1979 & Statistical Yearbook 1952). In the 1980s and 90s, the Japanese have continued to build a plurality of the world's shipping (Table 4).

Japan's defense treaty with the United States is still in force, allowing the Japanese to use the US Navy to defend themselves and their sea lanes (Mutual Defense Agreement 1954). This eases their overall defense burden. However, this protective mantle has hurt the Japanese in their ability to provide themselves with a viable defense. Japanese defense procurement has long been geared to move technology from the US to Japan. The goal has been to improve the Japanese ability to compete economically by learning the assembly process and then the production process for high-technology military systems. This approach has been conducted over successive generations of systems, and has been very successful.

The danger of this process is that Japan's defense procurement is based more in terms of economic goals instead of military necessity. High-tech items such as advanced fighters are built in quantity--their manufacture is transferable to civil aeronautics--the munitions that the fighter carries are not purchased in quantity--no civil market. To some extent this problem of defense decision-making affects all democratic countries, but Japan has been much more susceptible (Samuels 1994).

Japan's constitution renounces the use of force, and even the means of using force:

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Constitution of Japan 1947).

The countries of Southeast Asia receive 33% of Japanese exports, and supply Japan with 25% of its imports. In addition 18% of the country's exports go to Western Europe and pass through the Southeast Asian sealanes, as do the 15% of its imports which come from Europe. Of Japan's 1993 total GDP of $2.549 trillion (parity purchasing), 10% is dependent on trade to or through the region. These figures do not include the oil imports that Japan relies on so heavily (Central Intelligence Agency 1994).

Japan's current defense plans call for defense of sealanes 1000 nautical miles from Tokyo. That radius covers the sealanes to Guam and the Bashi Channel (the main shipping passage between Taiwan and Luzon), but not the Formosa Strait or the South China Sea (Sudo 1991). This was agreed to under the 1981 Mutual Security and Defense Treaty with the U.S. The current force structure of the Japanese Navy and Air Force would not allow easy extension of that defense much beyond that limit (Table 5 and Tables 11-12 in Appendix). Indeed, Japan has no plans to defend the Malacca Straits (Sudo 1991). Virtually all of Japan's oil flows through the South China Sea, making what goes on there of vital importance to Japan. That route is not completely critical. Tankers could make the detour around Indonesia, or through the Sunda Strait in between Java and Sumatra and then around the Philippines at the cost of three extra days of travel. That unexpected disruption would be an inconvenience, loss of the investment in South East Asia would be much more so.

Taiwan has the distinct disadvantage of being the mortal enemy of China. Both countries claim its own government as the ruler of all China. The mainland Chinese would view hostilely any attempt by Taiwan to change its position by overthrowing the People's Republic, or by seceding altogether (Gregor 1988). Taiwan's sole advantage lies in its relative isolation from the mainland by the Formosa Straits. It continues to rely on a navy that has the implicit support of the US Navy (Table 6 and Tables 13-14 in Appendix). Taiwan is allowed to lease ex-US Navy warships for its defense, manned by the Taiwanese (Jane's Fighting Ships 1995).

The Taiwanese economy is small compared to that of Japan or China. In recent years, it has been overtaken by that of Indonesia (see Table 3). This limits Taiwan's ability to stay with China or Japan in a major arms race, even though Taiwan obviously has the most to lose should China attain local naval superiority over it. Taiwan's navy had the advantage until recently of more ocean-going ships than the Chinese. No longer. The PRC Navy has surged ahead, placing the security of Taiwan in grave jeopardy, perhaps greater than at any time since the Quemoy/Matsu crisis of 1958.

Taiwan also is highly vulnerable to distant blockade. Taiwan relies on Persian Gulf oil for much of its energy. Cutting off that source north of the Malacca Strait would be relatively easy for China to do, and almost impossible for Taiwan to defend against without leaving it vulnerable to invasion (Muller 1988).

Figure 2

Several ASEAN nations have close ties to the US. The Philippines and Thailand have been host to US bases. Recently, these nations have abrogated their basing agreements. Thailand asked the US to leave in 1974 (Huxley 1993), and the Philippines did so in 1990 (Branigin 1992b). Getting the US Navy back in has proved difficult. In the Thai government refused to allow the US Navy to base a forward supply depot offshore (Sciolino 1994). Singapore does host the logistical headquarters for the region.

ASEAN has numerous disadvantages. Several member states have sizable Chinese populations which might prove sympathetic to Chinese claims in the region. The Chinese population could also serve as pretext for Chinese intervention (Klein 1989). One of its strongest members, Singapore, is also the smallest. Its navy and air force are directed far more to defend itself from its immediate neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, than that of any outsider. ASEAN nations have numerous border disputes among themselves to be resolved in the South China Sea (See Figure 2). These have come close to blows several times (Huxley 1993).

The resources of the South China Sea are another major concern for ASEAN nations (Tefft 1992). China recently passed legislation making large sections of the Spratly Islands Chinese territory. However, in 1995 it felt obliged to make a promise of safe passage around the claims (Tyler 1995). The normal exclusion zone around the islands could have choked off the sealanes entirely.

Finally, ASEAN is not SEATO. It is not a defense community, but a defense association. The member nations do not coordinate their defense spending or arrange for complementary areas of responsibility. As such they might prove as feckless in defense as the Arabs proved in offense against Israel in 1948. Lack of trust among the nations might prevent their full force from being used against the interloper. The eventual goal of ASEAN is a defense community, but that lies several years down the road (Tangsubkul 1982), until then ASEAN countries rely on a collection of bilateral treaties among its members instead of a multilateral treaty for all. The strengths and weaknesses of the ASEAN as individual countries follows.

For added security, ASEAN included Vietnam in 1995. Laos and Cambodia are prospective members for the association. These countries will improve the association by adding their emerging economies, but seriously complicates the ASEAN defense against China. By adding Vietnam, the border of ASEAN was moved up to China eliminating the buffer state. Furthermore, Cambodia has had close relations with the Chinese dating back to the Chinese support of the resistance to the Vietnamese invasion in 1979. All this would seriously complicate ASEAN decision making. No longer would a prospective conflict involve only naval and air forces. In the future, China could threaten a land invasion of an ASEAN member (Huxley 1993).

Vietnam has an economy still struggling to emerge from years of economic hardship. It commits a larger share of its economy to defense than any other ASEAN country, according to CIA estimates. This is due to the obvious menace of China just over the northern border. Vietnam has had armed clashes with China on three occassions since 1970 (counting the 1974 Paracel Islands naval battle between the PRC and South Vietnam).

Indonesia is the most populous member of ASEAN and has the largest economy. The Indonesian archipelago requires a large naval force to patrol. As a result, Indonesia has the most powerful navy in ASEAN, including the only submarines. Indonesia also controls several international straits including the Straits of Malacca, Java, and Sunda.

Indonesia produces and exports large quantities of oil. They also have an emeging industrial state boasting several shipyards, and a total industrial output rivaling Taiwan's as a share of GDP (See Table 8).

Malaysia is one of the lesser developed of the ASEAN members. This was a former British colony, and was hampered by the presence of the Singapore naval base--British developmental monies flowed to Singapore instead of its Malayan hinterland. The Malay peninsula was a source of raw materials to the British, not a source of trained labor and manufactured goods. Today, Malaysia is still struggling to modernize and industrialize. Malaysian industry has been developed primarily by outside capitalists, unlike the case in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and as a result, the Malaysian people are not as well trained in the business necessities as elsewhere in the region. Malaysia is primarily an exporter of raw materials and agricultural products (petroleum and petroleum products, palm oil, wood and wood products, and rubber). Malaysia manufactures electronic equipment and textiles (Central Intelligence Agency 1995).

Singapore has the smallest land mass of any of the ASEAN countries. It is also one of the most economically potent in terms of GDP per capita. It's 1994 growth rate of 10% is also outstanding. Singapore exports computer equipment, rubber and rubber products, petroleum products, and telecommunications equipment (Central Intelligence Agency 1995).

The Malaysian navy consists of just ten ASM carrying warships--a total of 32 ASMs. These are newer warships, but they are primarily fast attack craft, with a couple of slightly larger corvettes. These are a response to the increase Chinese threat to the region, but indicate that Malaysia can do little presently to defend itself against a determined interloper. Singapore has a more capable fleet. Malaysia has territorial disputes with Brunei and the Philippines centering on and around the island of Borneo (Valencia 1995).

The Philippines is one of the poorer countries in the region. The Marcos regime failed to make effective use of US aid to the country. With the pullout of US forces from Subic Bay and Clark Field, the Philippines have struggled to replace the cash flow. In addition, the Philippines navy has had increased responsibility placed upon it. The navy still does not have adequate forces to police the numerous islands of the archipelago, let alone deal with external threats. This is critical as China has chosen to move in on Philippine claimed territory in the Spratly Islands. In 1995 China installed a base on Mischief Reef just off the coast of the Philippine island of Palawan. Chinese occupancy of Spratly Island territory has tended toward the Philippine side of the island group (Valencia 1995). The Philippines have territorial disputes with Malaysia, also.

To counter these threats, the Philippines have the weakest navy in ASEAN. It's two major combatants are World War II castoffs from the US Navy, and barring a spectacular rise in its economy's ability to purchase newer craft, little possibility of expanding the force (See Table 15). The Philippine navy is barely adequate to police the archipelago, let alone deal with outside interlopers.

The sultanate of Brunei has the smallest economy of all the members of ASEAN. It's GDP in 1993 was $4.43 billion on a PPP basis. Per capita income in 1993 was $16,000 due to $2 billion in oil revenues (Central Intelligence Agency 1995). It is a party to the Spratly Island disputes by virtue of its claim to a 200 mile Economic Exclusion Zone declared in 1984 which extendes out from Louisa Reef off the coast. The sultanate is majority Muslim. Its sole border dispute (excluding the Spratlys) is with Malaysia over the Limbang territory of Sarawak which divides the sultanate in two (Acharya 1993). The sultanate's navy is a token force of fast attack boats, but features fairly modern weaponry.

Thailand is emerging into the ranks of the newly industrializing countries. It has changed from a producer of raw materials to a manufacturing center over the past thirty years. Thailand is slowly pursuing the other tigers of East Asia: Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong using the same basic methods of state-directed capitalism (Muscat 1994).

Thailand's military has spent the last few years participating more in politics than defending the state from interlopers. Despite that, the Thailand navy has a competent collection of ships (See Table 15), augmented by the acquisition in February 1996 of a small helicopter carrier capable of handling British Harrier I jump jets. The surface navy has a collection of 12 ASM carrying ships, but the four classes of ships carry four different ASMs from four different countries (Harpoon, US; Exocet, France; Gabriel, Israel; C801, China (PRC)). This would lead to a nightmarish logistical situation if Thailand became involved in a prolonged war.

Thailand also operates the only armed maritime patrol aircraft in the ASEAN. The three P-3 Orions can launch Harpoon missiles in addition to their role as ASW and maritime reconnaisance (See Table 16). These are the most important aircraft in the region because a) they have the ability to identify ships using a variety of onboard sensor systems from radar to infrared, b) their ability to disable or destroy any ship in the region outside of that ship's surface-to-air missile range, and c) their phenomenal range allows them to patrol anywhere in the South China Sea. Their only drawbacks are their lack of speed, and their vulnerablity to fighters.