The point of having sea power is to control the sea for the benefit of the state while denying it to others. For a modern navy, the most effective way of doing so is by carrying and using Anti-shipping Missiles (ASMs) . The best way to measure sea power is to use the number of ASMs as the measurement. Anti-shipping Missiles (ASMs) are weapons incorporating both self-propulsion and a guidance system, and designed primarily to hit ships. (ASM in military terminology can be used to refer to either anti-shipping missiles, or air-to-surface missiles. The former will be used throughout this thesis.)
Other methods of measuring sea power could be used. Modelski and Thompson after surveying 500 years of sea power settled on the nuclear submarine, especially the ballistic missile submarine, and the aircraft carrier as the capital ships of sea power for the post-World War II era (Modelski and Thompson 1988). This study is narrower in scope--this is not a question of global sea power, but theatre (regional) sea capability, and hence needs a measuring stick for smaller navies. None of the countries surveyed has an aircraft carrier (though several are discussing the acquisition), and only China has nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines.
The root of the measurement issue in sea power is whether to count ships or guns. Ships are easier to count; firepower is what wins battles. Modelski and Thompson counted ships over 500 years by defining a capital ship for each era. Capital ships are defined essentially as the ones with the most firepower. In the modern missile era, virtually any ship can carry ASMs. The distinction between ships are range, missile protection, and anti-submarine capabilities. Those combining all three are classed as corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers, and are called major surface combatants. They can usually survive more than one missile hit. Those lacking those characteristics are known as missile boats, or fast attack craft (FACs). It is important to note that the missile boats are still deadly to the major surface combatants.
Counting the number of submarines, especially nuclear powered ones, is another method of assessing seapower. Submarines have the ability to deny the control of the sea to others without making use of it positively. Submarines cannot escort merchant ships, because they cannot defend against the other great danger, that of aircraft.
Maritime patrol and attack aircraft are the last component of sea power to be considered. The ability to spot enemy ships first is an enormous tactical advantage. The Battle of Midway could not have been won without it. In a fast-moving missile environment, the side that spots the other first will usually win (Hughes 1995). Maritime aircraft are also significant carriers of ASMs in their own right. The U.S. P-3 Orion, for instance, can carry up to 10 Harpoon ASMs. The Chinese have a number of different types capable of carrying one or two of their heavier missiles.
For methodological reasons, aircraft-borne ASMs are much harder to count. Warships typically carry them in separate containers and do not carry reloads. A simple photo can suffice to show the total number of missiles that a ship can bring into combat. Aircraft are more difficult to factor into the equation precisely because their endurance is so short. Even during a relatively brief period of tension, aircraft would have plenty of time to fire their missiles, return to base, and reload. The numbers of missiles available at the base are unknown, and a closely kept secret. The only reasonable way to count them would be to assume a conservative reload figure for each aircraft. ASMs are expensive and it is doubtful that a large number would be stockpiled beyond a few days of combat. The difficulty in modern naval combat is finding targets, unless the targets are merchant ships. For the purposes of this study, each aircraft capable of launching an ASM will be assumed to have one reload available. The exception is the P-3 Orion which can carry up to 10 Harpoons on external pylons (Friedman 1989). It will be assumed to have a total of four ASMs.
China in particular has been upgrading missiles on its fast attack craft from the older Hung Ying to the C801 "Silkworm" variant. The transition involves both a change in the number of missiles carried (two C801s can be carried for each HY), and an obvious difference in quality. No attempt has been made to account for this change except in quantitative terms. Current estimates of missiles carried is reflected in the total missile numbers (See Figure 3). However, the sheer size of the Chinese FAC fleet makes determining the precise numbers of which ships have which missiles nearly impossible. Where firm data cannot be attained, the smaller number has been chosen, again to provide a conservative cushion. The worst case scenario would have China possessing almost double the number of missiles, and the numbers of reloads available at base is again completely unknown.
The first use of ASMs was in World War II, by both the Germans and Americans. Originally, guided missiles were remote controlled aircraft or modified glide bombs, usually using TV guidance. A TV camera mounted on the missile broadcast a picture back to the guiding aircraft. The Germans were the first to successfully use ASMs in combat against ships. During the Mediterranean campaign, they sank the Italian battleship Roma (after the Italian surrender), and badly damaged the British battleship Warspite. The Allies eventually ended the threat by discovering the frequencies that the Germans used to guide the missiles and jammed the signals.
For the purposes of this study ASMs are divided into two classes. Second class missiles are guided to the target either actively by an operator in the loop (first generation missiles), or passively by a designation system on the firing platform (second generation missiles). They can be defeated by obscuring the guidance system of the missile, interfering with the missile command system from the firing platform, or destroying the platform itself. Second class missiles are fairly easy to defeat, even though they are deadly. The first two generations of guided missiles fall into the second class. This study uncovered three main first or second generation ASMs used by countries in the region. They are the Chinese Hai-Ying, the Taiwanese Hsiung Feng 1, and the Israeli Gabriel missiles (used by Singapore and Thailand). All three require radio guidance from the host ship from launch to impact.
The Hai-Ying is a copy of the first generation Soviet Styx missile which was instrumental in sinking the Israeli destroyer Eilat during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. However, the guidance system and command control proved easy to disrupt, so much so that during the '73 War, the Syrians and Egyptians fired 70+ Styx missiles at Israeli vessels for no hits. For this reason, this study treats first and second generation missiles as a threat to merchant vessels, not modern warships.
The Hsiung Feng 1 is a second generation system copied from the Israeli Gabriel I system under license. It requires the operator to pick the target which is then continuously illuminated by the firing platform. This is a more automatic process than a first generation system in that the designation can be maintained by circuitry, but the guidance system onboard the firing platform is still a vulnerable point (Friedman 1989).
Some warships carry surface to air missiles (SAMs) to defend themselves against incoming aircraft and ASMs. The radar guided SAMs can also be used in a secondary role as anti-ship missiles. The Sea Sparrow and SM-1 & 2 are examples of this capability. The Sea Sparrow uses radar guidance from the firing platform to track its target. It is an adaptation of the AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile. It is used today as a next to last resort for anti-missile defense (the last resort being the Close In Weapons Systems [CIWS] such as the Phalanx 20mm or Goalkeeper 30mm auto cannons). The only time Sea Sparrow has been fired in a non-test situation was an accidental firing by the USS Saratoga at a Turkish destroyer during an exercise. The missile hit the bridge of the destroyer, killing the captain, but doing little other damage.
The SM-1 and SM-2 are American missiles primarily designed as anti-aircraft weapons but maintaining a secondary anti-ship role. Like the Sea Sparrow they would be useful mainly against missile boats, not major surface combatants. They do have the advantage of being the fastest anti-ship missiles in the American (and by extension, the Japanese and Taiwanese navies), but also the shortest ranged, and with very little explosive.
Since their main value to their host ship is their defense against aircraft and especially ASMs, this study does not include these missiles and the Sea Sparrow in the ASM missile totals. Inclusion would radically alter the balances for the American-supplied navies, but they were excluded for three reasons:
The Chinese C801, whose land variant (C802) is better known as the 'Silkworm', is also a third generation ASM. Variations of this missile can be fired from land, sea, or air. It was extensively used during the Iran-Iraq War by both sides against merchant shipping. Iraq fired a pair of C801s at the battleship Missouri during the Gulf War for no hits. One was distracted by chaff, the other shot down by an escorting British warship (Friedman 1989).
Any missile can be defeated in four ways: counterfire, distraction, evasion, and seduction. Counterfire is shooting down the missile. Distraction draws the missile into chasing after decoys away from the target. Evasion means the target moves out of the path of the missile (the guidance system on most missiles has a limited field of vision). Seduction is fooling the missile into missing by creating a larger target for it to hit through chaff or other electronic countermeasures (ECM) (Hughes 1995). Of the powers surveyed only the Japanese ships have the ability to consistently and successfully use countermeasures.
As can be seen from Figures 3-6, China has a lead in all but one of the categories of naval strength examined. In ASMs (Figure 3), China has held the advantage in the region since 1974. In submarines (Figure 4), China has held the lead since 1964, although Japan has the newer submarines. In anti-submarine capability (Figure 5), China has superior numbers, though again its capability is limited by the age and range of the vast majority of its ships. In maritime assigned aircraft (Figure 6), the Chinese have a large lead, offset only by the combination of range and strike power of the Japanese P-3 Orions. Only in major surface combatants is there a Japanese advantage in both quality and quantity, and this is partly offset by the distance that the Japanese have to go to get to the important sealanes compared to the Chinese.